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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of political activism in the 2008 presidential election extended 
throughout the country and even to where partisan politics have no place: the public 
school classroom. In 2004, the New York City Board of Education enacted a 
regulation that prohibited teachers from wearing any material supporting political 
candidates or organizations.1  During the 2008 election, teachers who wanted to wear 
partisan political buttons in the classroom while teaching claimed that the regulation 
violated their First Amendment rights.2  Although the Southern District of New York 
ultimately held that the teachers had no First Amendment claim, the court’s decision, 
which involved sorting out three different tests and the variations of those tests, 
demonstrated the inconsistency between the courts’ approaches to determining the 
First Amendment protections of teachers’ in-class speech.3 Some courts allow 
teachers to undermine decisions made by elected officials at the state and local levels 
about what should be said in the classroom.4  These decisions often take weeks, 
months, or even years to make.  In these jurisdictions, teachers can interject their 
personal views, which may be inconsistent with those of the local community and 
school board, and then hide behind the First Amendment as a grant of authority to do 
so.5  The Supreme Court has not definitively determined to what extent teachers’ 
instructional speech is protected by the First Amendment, and  the circuits are 
currently split on this question.  
                                                                
1
 Weingarten v. Bd. of Educ., 591 F. Supp. 2d 511, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (mem).  
2
 Id. 
3
 Id. at 515-20. 
4
 This Note explains how by applying either the Hazelwood or Pickering tests, courts will 
sometimes protect teachers’ speech in the classroom, and by doing this, courts allow teachers 
to undermine curricular decisions made by state and local governments. See infra note 65 
(discussing which courts apply the Hazelwood or Pickering tests).  
5
 Infra note 65. 
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The majority of the circuits6 apply either the precedent set forth in Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier7 or Pickering v. Board of Education8 to determine 
whether or not, and to what extent, teachers’ instructional speech is protected by the 
First Amendment.  Neither of these tests are appropriate for teachers’ instructional 
speech, though, as the context in which these tests were developed is not analogous 
to that of teachers’ speech in public schools.  Recognizing the pitfalls of the other 
two tests, the Third Circuit relied on Rust v. Sullivan9 to develop a third test.10 Rust 
provides a better framework for instructional speech because the Rust line of 
precedent stands for the proposition that when the government is the speaker, the 
person conveying the message for the government has no First Amendment 
protection.11  Under this analysis, when teachers are teaching, they are conveying the 
message prescribed by the state and local governments, and as such, teachers have no 
First Amendment protection in the classroom.   
Section II of this Note begins by giving an overview of how public education is 
funded and how national, state, and local governments control instructional speech 
based on funding.  Section III of this Note examines the three tests currently used to 
determine the extent that the First Amendment protects teachers instructional speech: 
Hazelwood, Pickering, and Rust.  This synopsis will include the facts and holdings of 
the cases that laid the framework for each test, the test itself, and how the test is 
applied to teachers’ instructional speech.  Section IV will then show why the 
Hazelwood and Pickering tests are not optimal for instructional speech cases.  Once 
it is established that these tests have no application in the teachers’ instructional 
speech cases, Section IV will show how and why the Rust test best promotes the 
interests of the government and teachers in the classroom.  This Note concludes that 
teachers’ freedom of expression is limited only during actual in class speech, and by 
requiring this, the government is merely “insisting that public funds be spent for the 
purposes for which they were authorized.”12   
II.  CREATING AND FUNDING THE CURRICULUM 
Because Rust stands for the proposition that when the government funds a 
program, the government can insist that funds are being spent for the purposes they 
were authorized,13 it is important to show how the federal, state, and local 
governments fund public education and how, through funding, the government 
controls what is said in the classroom. 
                                                                
6
 See Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1149 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(explaining that all but one of the circuits use either the Hazelwood test or the Pickering test).  
7
 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
8
 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).  
9
 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
10
 See Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 271 F.3d at 1149 n.6 (explaining that the Third Circuit uses a 
third test, the Rust test (citing Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of  Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491-92 (3d Cir. 
1998))). 
11
 Id. 
12
 Rust, 500 U.S. at 196.  
13
 Id. 
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A.  Federal Level 
Although historically, the financing and control of public education belonged to 
the state and local governments,14 the federal government’s presence in this area is 
constantly expanding.15 The federal government’s role in public education 
commenced in 1965 when President Lyndon Baines Johnson signed the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)16 into law as a response to the perceived 
failings of the states in education.17  Although the ESEA was originally meant to help 
economically disadvantaged children, the bill “became the foundation of modern 
education policy.”18  The ESEA remained untouched for over 35 years until 
President George W. Bush signed the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB),19 an Act 
which greatly increased federal spending on public education.20  Even though federal 
support began in 1965 with a single act, the federal government now has a 
Department of Education,21 thirty agencies, and over one hundred programs, all of 
which supplement the state and local governments’ role in public education.22 
The federal government has a very limited role in public education, as federal 
funds and control of those funds only provide assistance to the states.23  States do not 
have to accept federal funds; however, acceptance of certain funds is conditioned on 
the states’ compliance with the federal law for which the funds were allocated.24  
                                                                
14
 Brandi M. Powell, Comment, Take the Money or Run?: The Dilemma of the No Child 
Left Behind Act for State and Local Governments, 6 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 153, 155 (2005).  In 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), the Court recognized that “‘education 
is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.’”  Mildred Wigfall 
Robinson, School Finance Reform: Financing Adequate Educational Opportunity, 14 J.L. & 
POL. 483, 484 (1998) (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).  
15
 For example, between 1965 and 2007, federal funding for public education for grades 
K-12 increased five-fold from $11.8 billon dollars per year to $70.6 billion dollars per year.  
Dan Lips, Focus on Education Policy: The Next Chapter in the Tragic History of Federal 
Education Policy, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 27, 29 (2008). 
16
 Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 
(1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006)); see also Lips, supra note 15, at 28. 
17
 Powell, supra note 14, at 156.  
18
 Lips, supra note 15, at 28.  
19
 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006)). 
20
 Lips, supra note 15, at 31.  
21
 President Jimmy Carter created the Department of Education in 1979.  Id. at 28. 
22
 Powell, supra note 14, at 158-59.  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 10 FACTS ABOUT 
K-12 EDUCATION FUNDING 4 (2005), http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/10facts/ 
10facts.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2010) (listing some of the major programs, as well as the 
amount of money the federal government contributed to each program in 2006). 
23
 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 22, at 1.   
24
 Powell, supra note 14, at 155-56.  The U.S. Department of Education even notes that 
following federal programs’ “requirements” is voluntarily done by the state, and if the state 
does not want to abide by the requirements, the state should not accept the funds.  U.S. DEP’T 
OF EDUC., supra note 22, at 4.  
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss1/7
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Under Title I of NCLB, for example, states must meet federally mandated timelines 
of students’ achievements and progress or states could lose federal funding;25 
however, it is the states, and not the federal government, that control the standards 
that the students have to maintain under the Act.26 Therefore, even though receipt of 
federal funds is condition on federal control of funds, the federal government still 
does not have nearly as much control on specific school matters as the state and local 
governments.27  Not only does the federal government have very little control over 
the curriculum, but federal spending accounts for less than ten percent28 of the total 
funds for public education, with over ninety percent of funding for public schools 
coming from the state and local governments.29  
B.  State and Local Level 
Because the United States Constitution does not mention public education, the 
duty of public education rests with the states by virtue of the Tenth Amendment.30 
Almost every state constitution includes language that guarantees some form of 
public education,31 and while the states’ plenary power over public education derives 
from state constitutions, the method of implementation is specified in state statutes.32 
In most states, statutes create and delegate powers to administrative agencies, such as 
state boards of education or state departments of education.33  These agencies and 
departments adopt policies, rules, and regulations needed to conform with statutory 
and constitutional requirements.34  Along with creating agencies and departments, 
state statutes also regulate the teaching of certain subjects, develop testing programs, 
and establish minimum requirements for high school graduation.35  
                                                                
25
 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006); see also Powell, supra note 14, at 159-65 (discussing specifics 
of NCLB).  
26
 Lips, supra note 15, at 32.  
27
 See infra text accompanying notes 30-57 (discussing state and local government control 
of specific school matters).  
28
 Lips, supra note 15, at 31 (noting that federal spending for public education has reached 
historic highs under NCLB, but only accounts for nine percent of total funding); Powell, supra 
note 14, at 158 (explaining that between 1965 and 1997 federal spending was between four 
and seven percent). 
29
 Lips, supra note 15, at 31; Powell, supra note 14, at 158.  
30
 NATHAN L. ESSEX, SCHOOL LAW AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR 
EDUCATIONAL LEADERS 2 (3d ed. 2005). 
31
 STUART BIEGEL, EDUCATION AND THE LAW 428 (2006); ROBERT H. PALESTINI & KAREN 
F. PALESTINI, LAW AND AMERICAN EDUCATION: A CASE BRIEF APPROACH 5 (2d ed. 2006). 
32
 PALESTINI & PALESTINI, supra note 31, at 5-6. 
33
 MICHAEL IMBER & TYLL VAN GEEL, EDUCATION LAW 4 (3d ed. 2004). 
34
 PALESTINI & PALESTINI, supra note 31, at 6. 
35
 For a more comprehensive list of what state statutes generally specify, see ESSEX, supra 
note 30, at 3-4, IMBER & VAN GEEL, supra note 33, at 3-4, and PALESTINI & PALESTINI, supra 
note 31, at 5-6. 
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As the educational duty rests with the states, so does the duty to fund public 
education.  While the federal government contributes some funds to public 
education, over ninety percent of the funding derives from the state and local 
governments.36 Most states raise capital for education through  a “multifaceted 
finance system,” with money coming from a combination of the state and local 
governments.37  The primary source of state funding derives from sales tax,38 
whereas property tax is the primary source of funding for the local districts.39  
Although local districts are responsible for levying property taxes, they have the 
ability to do so only based on a grant of authority, expressed or implied, from the 
state.40  While the amount of interaction between the states and their political 
subdivisions can vary,41 the state is chiefly responsible for financing public 
education.42 
Along with funding, state legislatures have the primary responsibility to specify 
the curriculum.43  The most common way the state controls the curriculum is by 
mandating specific courses required for high school graduation.44  In most states, 
statutes either authorize or prohibit the teaching of certain subjects and topics.45 
Some state legislatures provide even more specific and detailed requirements of 
course content.46  For example, some “[s]tate testing requirements, such as the 
statewide final exams used in New York, create an implicit syllabus” that all districts 
                                                                
36
 Lips, supra note 15, at 31; Powell, supra note 14, at 158-59. 
37
 IMBER & VAN GEEL, supra note 33, at 307.   
38
 Jeffrey D. Van Volkenburg, What Public Education Should Learn from Major League 
Baseball: Spending Caps, Luxury Taxes and Fiscal Accountability, 32 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 
237, 242 (2007).   
39
 Funding through property taxes imposed by the local districts usually accounts for thirty 
to fifty percent of public education funds.  Id. 
40
 IMBER & VAN GEEL, supra note 33, at 307. 
41
 Van Volkenburg, supra note 38, at 242 (noting that “local school systems receive 
anywhere between 27 and 77 percent of their funding from the state”).  
42
 IMBER & VAN GEEL, supra note 33, at 307. 
43
 Id. at 62. 
44
 ESSEX, supra note 30, at 4.  In Ohio, for example, the Ohio Department of Education 
specifies that seniors graduating prior to 2013 must take the following: four units of English 
language arts; half a unit of Health; three units each of Math, Science, and Social Studies; half 
a unit of Physical Education; and six units of Electives.  OHIO BD. OF EDUC., GRADUATION 
REQUIREMENTS, http://ode.state.oh.us/ (follow “Teaching” hyperlink; then follow “Instruction” 
hyperlink; then follow “Graduation Requirements/Ohio Core” hyperlink; then follow 
“Graduation Requirements” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).  The ODE further 
specifies that the science units must include one unit of biological studies and one unit of 
physical sciences; the social studies units must include half a unit of American history and half 
a unit of American government; and the electives must include one unit or two half units in 
business, technology, fine arts or foreign language.  Id.  
45
 IMBER & VAN GEEL, supra note 33, at 64-65.  For example, some states will require that 
the curriculum include patriotic themes and topics.  Id. at 65. 
46
 Id. at 64.  
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss1/7
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in the state must follow.47  Testing requirements are not the only way states control 
the curriculum.  In more than half of the states, the text-book selection process is 
done by the state legislatures or through text-book commissions appointed by the 
state legislatures.48  While the primary authority of public school curriculum belongs 
to the states, all but one49 of the states have voluntarily entrusted local school boards 
to fill in the remaining curricular gaps.50 
Although minimum standards are developed by state statute, local school boards 
establish the specifics concerning the curriculum.51  For example, even when the 
states require teaching of a specific course, states usually allow school boards to 
construct their own syllabi for that course.52  Furthermore, in states that do not have a 
state wide text-book selection process, the selection power belongs to the local 
districts.53  More so than the state legislatures, local school boards “affect the 
political and cultural perspectives of school programs” by determining specific 
courses and topics in the curriculum.54  In some situations, local schools even have 
the authority to specify the type of methods of instruction in the schools.55  All stages 
of the curriculum, from broad graduation requirements to specific course content,56 
are determined through complex methods involving state and local governments.57 
While the state and local governments prescribe the curriculum, teachers are 
responsible for its implementation.58  Constitutional issues arise when teachers in the 
classroom attempt to speak outside of the curriculum.59  Many teachers feel as 
though they have a constitutional right to control their own curriculums and 
instructional methodologies, a constitutional right known as “academic freedom.”60  
                                                                
47
 Id. 
48
 Id. at 64-65. 
49
 Hawaii is the only state where the schools are entirely state-run.  Id. at 307. 
50
 Id. at 62.  
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. at 66. 
53
 Id. at 65. 
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. at 64-65.  
56
 Id. at 112-13.  
57
 Id. at 113. 
58
 William G. Buss, Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech: Communicating the 
Curriculum, 2 J. GENDER RACE  &  JUST. 213, 256 (1999). 
59
 Id. at 214.  
60
 In Rebecca Gose Lynch, Comment, Pawns of the State or Priests of Democracy? 
Analyzing Professors’ Academic Freedom Rights Within the State’s Managerial Realm, 91 
CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (2003), the author notes that:  
The term [academic freedom] actually refers to two different concepts: “professional” 
academic freedom and “constitutional” academic freedom.  The professional notion 
centers on professional ethics of self-governance and autonomy. . . .  The 
constitutional notion, on the other hand, is legal rather than ethical and was developed 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
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No court has recognized that teachers have an absolute constitutional right to control 
the curriculum,61 as what is taught in the classroom is matter of state and local 
control.62  The issue, however, is not as clear when it comes to the First Amendment 
rights of teachers in the classroom.  
III.  TEACHERS’ INSTRUCTIONAL SPEECH AND FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION: 
TESTS APPLIED 
The Supreme Court has never specifically addressed to what extent public 
teachers are entitled to First Amendment protection in the classroom.63  The circuits 
are split on which test should be applied when answering this question,64 and the 
majority use either the Hazelwood test or the Pickering test to reach a conclusion.65 
A third test, the Rust test, has been applied in at least one case involving teachers’ 
instructional speech.66  Very little judicial reasoning exists in the circuits concerning 
why a circuit applies one test over another,67 and further confusion arises as the 
application of the tests varies among the circuits.68 
                                                          
by courts after professors began to sue for academic speech rights under the First 
Amendment. 
Id. (footnote omitted).  See generally Buss, supra note 58 (focusing on whether academic 
freedom is an independent ground for teachers’ free speech under the First Amendment); 
Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers’ Classroom Speech and the First Amendment, 30 J.L. 
& EDUC. 1, 39-41 (2001) (discussing academic freedom and the right to speak);  Neal H. 
Hutchens, Silence at the Schoolhouse Gate: The Diminishing First Amendment Rights of 
Public School Employees, 97 KY. L. J. 37, 56-62 (2008) (looking at academic freedom as a 
constitutional concern). 
61
 Daly, supra note 60, at 40-41; Lynch, supra note 60, at 1068.  Although no court has 
found teachers have a constitutional right to academic freedom, academic freedom may 
nonetheless be used as a defense only when teachers can show “that [they] did not defy 
legitimate state and local curriculum directives, followed accepted professional norms for that 
grade level and subject matter, discussed matters that were of public concern, and acted 
professionally and in good faith when there was no precedent or policy.”  PALESTINI & 
PALESTINI, supra note 31, at 73-74. 
62
 ESSEX, supra note 30, at 279. 
63
 Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001); see also 
Walter E. Kuhn, Note, First Amendment Protection of Teacher Instructional Speech, 55 DUKE 
L.J. 995, 997 (2006). 
64
 Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 271 F.3d at 1149 n.6.  
65
 Id. (explaining that the First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits use the 
Hazelwood test, whereas the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits use the Pickering test); Daly, 
supra note 60, at 16 (“The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and D.C. Circuits apply Pickering, while 
the First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits employ Hazelwood in their analysis of 
teachers’ in class speech.” (footnotes omitted)); Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1001. 
66
 Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Cal. Teachers 
Ass’n, 271 F.3d at 1149 n.6 (explaining that the Third Circuit uses a third test, the Rust test).  
67
 Daly, supra note 60, at 17. 
68
 Id.  
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A.  The Hazelwood Test 
The Hazelwood test originates from the student speech case Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District.69  Although the test, set out in Tinker and 
later refined by Hazelwood, examines the protections of students’ speech in public 
schools, the courts have, nonetheless, extended this test to teachers’ speech. 
1.  Tinker: Laying out the Framework for Hazelwood 
In Tinker, the Supreme Court addressed the protections of students’ speech in 
public schools.70  After the school administration became aware that a group of 
students were planning to wear black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam 
War, the school principals of the Des Moines public schools adopted a policy, which 
mandated that any student wearing an armband to school would be asked to remove 
it and would be suspended for failure to do so.71  When two students were suspended 
from school for refusing to remove their armbands,72 the father of the two students 
filed a complaint claiming the schools’ regulation violated the First Amendment.73 
Emphasizing that there was no evidence that the schools’ regulation was necessary to 
avoid a material and substantial interference with school work or discipline,74 the 
Court concluded that the regulation violated the students’ constitutional rights to free 
speech under the First Amendment.75  The Court also acknowledged that “First 
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment, are available to teachers and students.”76 
2.  The Hazelwood Case 
Almost twenty years after Tinker, the Supreme Court once again examined the 
First Amendment protections of students’ speech in Hazelwood.77 The dispute in 
Hazelwood arose when school officials for Hazelwood East High School deleted two 
articles from the student-run school newspaper.78  Three former staff members of the 
                                                                
69
 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); see also Emily 
Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on School-
Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 70 (2008) (explaining that the Supreme Court in 
Hazelwood  relied on Tinker to reach their decision).  
70
 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
71
 Id. at 504. 
72
 Id.  
73
 Id. at 504-05. 
74
 Id. at 509-10. 
75
 Id. at 514.  
76
 Id. at 506 (second emphasis added). 
77
 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
78
 Id. at 262.  One article, which discussed students’ experience with pregnancy, was 
removed to keep the identity of the pregnant girls a secret; in addition, the references to sexual 
activity and birth control were deemed inappropriate for the younger students.  Id. at 263.  The 
other article, which discussed the impact of divorce and included many quotes from students 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
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newspaper brought suit claiming that removal of the articles constituted a violation 
of the First Amendment.79  At the start of the opinion, the Court famously 
acknowledged that “[s]tudents in the public schools do not ‘shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’”80  The Court 
held that because the newspaper was not a forum for public expression, the school 
officials were entitled to regulate the paper’s contents in any “reasonable” manner.81  
The Court also set up the framework for the Hazelwood test by holding that 
educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the 
style and content of school sponsored speech, so long as regulations reasonably 
relate to legitimate pedagogical concerns.82  
3.  Hazelwood Test and Application to Teachers’ Instructional Speech 
Even though Hazelwood involved students’ speech, it has also been extended to 
teachers’ instructional speech.  In circuits that use the Hazelwood test,83 a regulation 
of teachers’ in-class speech is valid only when the regulation reasonably relates to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.84  
The Tenth Circuit was the first court to apply Hazelwood to a public school 
teacher by upholding the actions of school authorities in forbidding a fifth grade 
teacher from keeping two religious books in his classroom and reading the Bible 
during silent reading time.85  Interestingly enough, the court extended Hazelwood to 
create a new standard for teachers’ speech without reasoning, analysis, or 
precedent.86  One year later, the Tenth Circuit relied on Hazelwood again to hold that 
a high school teacher had no First Amendment claim for comments that he made in 
class concerning a widely known rumor that two students had sex on the school’s 
tennis courts.87  The Tenth Circuit found “no reason to distinguish between the 
classroom discussion of students and teachers in applying Hazelwood here.  A 
school’s interests in regulating classroom speech . . . are implicated regardless of 
                                                          
concerning their parents, was removed because the principal believed that the parents should 
have an opportunity to respond or consent to the publication.  Id.  
79
 Id. at 262. 
80
 Id. at 266 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). 
81
 Id. at 270.  
82
 Id. at 273.  
83
 See supra note 65. 
84
 Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1010. 
85
 Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1049 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Kuhn, supra note 
63, at 1010. 
86
 Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1020 (“Indeed, the first court to apply the Hazelwood standard 
to teachers engaged in only the most cursory analysis, and failed to cite any First Amendment 
precedent involving teachers.  Creating a new standard out of a case with dissimilar facts 
should be done with careful explanation and thoughtful analysis of the connections between 
the different contexts, but instead, the predominant test for deciding instructional speech cases 
was tailored in response to student speech concerns and applied to teachers with little regard 
for the consequences.” (footnote omitted)). 
87
 Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 774 (10th Cir. 1991).  
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whether that speech comes from a teacher or student.”88 Subsequently, many circuits 
followed the Tenth Circuit in applying the Hazelwood test to teachers’ instructional 
speech.89  The circuits that do not use the Hazelwood test90 primarily rely on the 
Pickering test. 
B.  The Pickering Test 
Whereas the Hazelwood test derives from student speech, the Pickering test 
focuses on the speech of teachers as public employees.91  In Pickering, the Supreme 
Court created a test to protect teachers’ speech made outside of classroom,92 and 
fifteen years later in Connick v. Myers,93 the Court modified Pickering into a two-
step analysis for all public employee speech.94  
1.  The Pickering Case 
In Pickering, a public school teacher was dismissed after writing a letter that 
attacked the school board’s handling of financial resources to the editor of the local 
newspaper.95  The teacher brought suit claiming that his letter was protected by the 
First Amendment.96  The Court began its analysis by noting the difficulty in finding 
“a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting 
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”97  The Court 
reasoned that the teacher’s comments were shown not to impede the performance of 
the teacher’s duties in the classroom nor to interfere with the operation of the 
school.98  Because the school board’s interest in limiting the teacher’s opportunity to 
contribute to the matter of public concern was not significantly greater than the 
board’s interest in limiting a similar contribution by any other member of the general 
public, the teacher’s letter was protected by the First Amendment.99 
                                                                
88
 Waldman, supra note 69, at 80 (quoting Miles, 944 F.2d at 777). 
89
 See supra note 65.  
90
 Id. 
91
 Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1001-02. 
92
 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968). 
93
 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
94
 Elizabeth Dale, Employee Speech & Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading of 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 182 (2008). 
95
 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566. 
96
 Id. at 567.  
97
 Id. at 568. 
98
 Id. at 572-73. 
99
 Id. at 573. 
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2.  Connick: Refining the Pickering Test 
Fifteen years after Pickering, the Supreme Court again balanced the interests of 
an employee as a citizen and the state as an employer.100  In Connick v. Myers, the 
district attorney’s office terminated an assistant to the district attorney after the 
assistant distributed a questionnaire to solicit the views of other employees regarding 
the office transfer policy.101  The employee brought suit, claiming that her 
termination was wrongful as it violated her First Amendment right to free speech.102  
The Court held that the employee’s limited First Amendment interest did not require 
the employer to tolerate the employee’s actions because the employer reasonably 
believed the actions would disrupt the office, undermine authority, and destroy the 
close relationships within the office.103  The Connick decision increased attention to 
public employer interests and also turned the flexibility of Pickering into a rigid, 
two-step test.104 
3.  Pickering Test and Application to Teachers’ Instructional Speech 
The Pickering test, also known as the balancing test, consists of a two-step 
analysis.105  First, the court must decide whether the speech involves a matter of 
public concern,106 which must be determined by the content, form, and context of the 
speech in question.107  If the matter does not touch on a matter of public concern, 
then the First Amendment inquiry stops because the speech is not constitutionally 
protected.108  When the speech does touch on a matter of public concern, the court 
must then weigh the teachers’ interest in expression against the government’s interest 
in workplace efficiency and avoidance of  disruption.109  The focus of this test is 
                                                                
100
 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983). 
101
 Id. at 140-42.  
102
 Id. at 141. 
103
 Id. at 154. 
104
 Dale, supra note 94, at 182-83. 
105
 Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1149 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Daly, supra note 60, at 17; Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1001-02; see also Mitchell J. Michalec, 
The Classified Information Protection Act, Killing the Messenger or Killing the Message, 50 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 455, 460-61 (2002). 
106
 Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 271 F.3d at 1149 n.6; Daly, supra note 60, at 17; Kuhn, supra 
note 63, at 1001-02. 
107
 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.  As to content of the speech, matters that relate to 
“‘political, social, or other concern to the community,’ as opposed to matters ‘only of personal 
interest,’” are usually held to be matters of  public concern.  Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 
428 F.3d 223, 229 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 
1036, 1052 (6th Cir. 2001)).  The Fifth Circuit has also noted that “issues do not rise to a level 
of ‘public concern’ [merely] by virtue of the speaker’s interest in the subject matter.”  
Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 1989).  
108
 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. 
109
 Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 271 F.3d at 1149 n.6 (citing Brewster v. Bd. of Educ., 149 F.3d 
971, 978 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
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more on the nature of the teachers’ speech,110 whereas the Hazelwood test focuses on 
the reasonableness of the administration in regulating the speech.111 
Although Pickering was developed in the context of a teacher’s out-of-class 
speech and Connick was developed in the public employer’s setting, the test has, 
nonetheless, been extended to teachers’ in-class speech.  The Fifth Circuit first 
applied the Pickering test in Kirkland v. Northside Independent School District, 
when a teacher claimed he had been dismissed for using an unapproved reading 
list.112  Although the Court mentioned Hazelwood, the Court applied Pickering by 
holding that the teacher’s use of an unapproved reading list did not rise to the level 
of public concern.113  Even though other circuits have followed the Fifth Circuit in 
applying Pickering to teachers’ classroom speech,114 the Fourth Circuit was the only 
court to explain its reasoning for using Pickering rather than Hazelwood by 
clarifying that with teachers’ instructional speech: “This is not a case concerning 
pupil speech, as in Hazelwood, either classroom or otherwise.  This case concerns 
itself exclusively with employee speech, as does Connick [and Pickering].”115 
Despite extending Pickering to teachers’ classroom speech, a recent change to the 
test has created  another split among courts already applying Pickering.  
4.  Garcetti: Creating a Split Among the Split 
In 2006, the Supreme Court refined the Pickering analysis once again by 
examining  whether or not a government employee’s speech is protected by the First 
Amendment when made pursuant to the employee’s official duties.116  In Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, a calendar deputy employed by the county district attorney’s office 
discovered that an affidavit used to secure a search warrant contained serious 
misrepresentations, and the deputy wrote a disposition memorandum to one of his 
supervisors recommending dismissal of the case.117  After allegedly being subjected 
to a series of retaliatory employment actions as a result of the memorandum, the 
deputy brought suit claiming that his supervisors’ alleged retaliation violated his 
First Amendment rights.118  The Court explained that while employees who make 
public statements outside the course of performing their official duties retain some 
possibility of First Amendment protection, when a public employee speaks within 
his or her official employment duties, “there is no relevant analogue to speech by 
citizens who are not government employees.”119  Ultimately, the Court held that the 
                                                                
110
 Daly, supra note 60, at 17. 
111
 Id. 
112
 Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 795-96. 
113
 Id. at 800-01. 
114
 See supra note 65. 
115
 Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 371 n.2 (4th Cir. 1998). 
116
 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006).  
117
 Id. at 413-14. 
118
 Id. at 415. 
119
 Id. at 423-24. 
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First Amendment does not prohibit an employer’s discipline based on an employee’s 
expressions made pursuant to official duties and responsibilities.120 
Currently, only two Circuits have addressed whether or not Garcetti applies to 
teachers’ instructional speech,121 and each has reached different conclusions.122  The 
Fourth Circuit determined that the court should continue to apply the traditional 
Pickering test because the Supreme Court did not explicitly extend Garcetti to 
teachers.123  The Seventh Circuit, however, determined that Garcetti applies to 
teachers’ instructional speech and that the First Amendment does not entitle teachers 
to speak outside of the curriculum adopted by the school system.124  Under the 
Garcetti test, the Seventh Circuit noted that because school systems pay teachers’ 
salaries, school systems could, therefore, regulate the speech.125  The principles 
underlying Garcetti reflect the same underlying principles of the Rust test, namely 
that teachers in the classroom have no First Amendment protections. 
C.  The Rust Test 
Instead of looking at teachers’ speech in the context of public employees as the 
Pickering test does, the Rust test examines teachers’ speech in the context of 
government speech.126 Originally created for abortion-related speech made by 
doctors using government funds to provide family-funding services,127 the Rust test 
has been used to prohibit First Amendment claims in the arts128 and public 
libraries.129  
1.  Rust v. Sullivan: Government Speech 
In 1970, Congress passed Title X, under which federal funds would be provided 
for family-funding services.130  In an attempt to ensure that the funds were used for 
Congress’s intended purposes,131 the Act specified that Title X funds could not be 
                                                                
120
 Id. at 424. 
121
 Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:03CV091, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58202, at *26 
(S.D. Ohio July 30, 2008); Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th 
Cir. 2007); Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694 (4th Cir. 2007). 
122
 Evans-Marshall, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58202, at *26; Mayer, 474 F.3d at 477; Lee, 
484 F.3d at 687.  
123
 Evans-Marshall, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58202, at *26-27; Lee, 484 F.3d at 695. 
124
 Evans-Marshall, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58202, at *26; Mayer, 474 F.3d at 480. 
125
 Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479; Dale, supra note 94, at 201. 
126
 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).  
127
 Id.  
128
 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
129
 United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
130
 Rust, 500 U.S. at 178. 
131
 Id. at 178-79 (explaining that the funds were intended “to support preventive family 
planning services, population research, infertility services, and other related medical, 
informational, and education activities” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 91-1667, at 8 (1970) (Conf. 
Rep.))). 
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used to provide abortion counseling as a family planning method; Title X projects 
could not encourage or promote abortion as a family method; and Title X projects 
had to be organized so that they were financially and physically separated from 
abortion activities.132  Several Title X grantees and doctors brought suit, claiming 
that the abortion related regulations violated the First Amendment rights of the 
clients and healthcare providers.133  The Court noted that when the government funds 
a program, it is entitled to both define the limits of the program134 and insist that 
those “public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.”135 The 
Court ultimately held that the regulations did not violate the First Amendment 
because the regulations did not force the employees to give up abortion related 
speech, and the regulations merely required that abortion activities be kept distinct 
from the activities of the Title X project, which the employees were voluntarily 
employed to do.136  
2.  Rust Line of Precedent 
Over the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has expanded Rust’s reach.  One 
of the most notable cases where Rust was applied is Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of the University of Virginia,137 in which students from the University of 
Virginia brought suit claiming a First Amendment violation when university 
guidelines prohibited the allocation of student funds for religious activities.138  The 
Court extensively quoted Rust and noted that when the government appropriates 
public funds to promote a particular message, it is entitled to take legitimate and 
reasonable steps to ensure the message is not distorted.139  Although the Rust holding 
ultimately was not extended to the facts of the case, as the funds in question were 
student funds and not government funds,140 the case is still commonly cited to for its 
approving analysis of Rust.141 
                                                                
132
 Id. at 179-80.  
133
 Id. at 181.  The specific issue before the Court was whether the regulations violated the 
First Amendment by impermissibly discriminating on viewpoint because the regulations 
prohibited all speech concerning abortion as a lawful option.  Id. at 182. 
134
 Id. at 194. 
135
 Id. at 196. 
136
 Id. at 198-99. 
137
 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
138
 Id. at 827.  Specifically, the guidelines stated that Student Activity Funds could not be 
used to support the following: “religious activities, philanthropic contributions and activities, 
political activities, activities that would jeopardize the University’s tax-exempt status, those 
which involve payment of honoraria or similar fees, or social entertainment or related 
expenses.”  Id. at 825.  The students who brought suit were in charge of a Christian newspaper 
and claimed the school’s failure to authorize printing costs for the religious newspaper 
violated the First Amendment.  Id. at 827. 
139
 Id. at 833 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 194, 196-200). 
140
 Id. at 834, 836. 
141
 See generally Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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Three years after Rosenberger, the Supreme Court expanded Rust’s holding to 
reach the arts. In National Endowment of the Arts v. Finley,142 Congress allocated 
subsidies to fund the arts, and with these funds, Congress imposed certain criteria 
restricting the type of art the funds could be used to create.143  Relying on Rust, the 
Court held that because Congress funded the art projects, Congress’s determination 
to favor certain beliefs expressed, through funding restrictions, did not infringe on 
anyone’s freedom of speech.144  Five years after Finley,145 the Court again applied 
Rust in United States v. American Library Ass’n146 to hold that government 
restrictions, which forbade public libraries from receiving federal funding for 
internet access unless the libraries installed a filter software on the internet, did not 
violate library patrons’ First Amendment rights.147  Even though the majority 
recognized that public libraries provide internet access to encourage diversity and to 
facilitate research and learning,148 the Court, nonetheless, found that the government 
could impose restrictions because it was merely insisting that “funds be spent for the 
purposes for which they were authorized.”149  The Rust line of precedent stands for 
the proposition that by restricting government-funded speech, “the [g]overnment is 
                                                                
142
 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
143
 Id. at 575.  After the subsidies were used for what Congress described as obscene and 
pornographic art, Congress imposed the restrictions on the art.  The restrictions stated that the 
funds may not be used to: 
[P]romote, disseminate, or produce materials which in the judgment of [the NEA] may 
be considered obscene, including but not limited to, depictions of sadomasochism, 
homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex acts 
and which, when taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value. 
Id. (quoting Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701, 741 (1989)). 
144
 Id. at 587-88. 
145
 It is important to note that three years after Finley and two years before American 
Library Ass’n, the Court appeared to curtail Rust’s reach in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 
531 U.S. 533 (2001).  Under the Legal Services Corporation Act, Congress appropriated funds 
to local organizations for the purpose of providing legal assistance to indigent clients.  Id. at 
536.  Congress imposed a restriction that prohibited LSC lawyers from providing legal 
representation with LSC funds if the representation involved an effort to change existing 
welfare law.  Id. at 536-37.  Lawyers employed by the LSC grant brought suit claiming the 
restrictions violated the First Amendment.  Id.  Noting that “an LSC-funded attorney speaks 
on behalf of the client in a claim against the government for welfare benefits,” the Court found 
that Rust was not applicable because the government program in question was not intended to 
promote a government message but to promote private speech.  Id. at 542-43.  Although 
Velazquez is important for its discussion of Rust and Rosenberger, this decision does not stand 
in the way of applying Rust to instructional speech, because in Velazquez, the very essence of 
the program required that the government not be the speaker, which is not the case in public 
education.  
146
 United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).  
147
 Id. 
148
 Id. at 206-07. 
149
 Id. at 211-12 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991)).  
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not denying a benefit to anyone, but is instead simply insisting that public funds be 
spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.”150  As the Supreme Court has 
gradually and continually expanded the Rust reasoning to the arts and public 
libraries, at least one lower court has extended Rust to teachers’ speech in the 
classroom.151  
3.  Rust Test and Application to Teachers’ Instructional Speech 
Under the test developed by the Court in Rust, “when the government is the 
speaker, in the sense that the government is conveying a particular message through 
a person, that person receives no First Amendment protection.”152 
The Third Circuit is the only circuit to apply this test to teachers’ instructional 
speech and has only done so in the university setting.153  In Edwards v. California 
University of Pennsylvania, quoting Rosenberger, the Third Circuit stated the 
following: “When the University determines the content of the education it provides, 
it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate the 
content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private 
entities to convey its own message.”154  Applying Rust and Rosenberger, the Third 
Circuit held “that a public university professor does not have a First Amendment 
right to decide what will be taught in the classroom.”155  Since the Third Circuit 
applied the Rust test in Edwards, it has been extended to other cases involving 
teachers’ curricular speech.156  Despite the original application to a university setting, 
it is well accepted that K-12 teachers should receive less First Amendment protection 
than university professors.157  Edwards and Rust, at the very least, show the ceiling 
rather than the floor for teachers’ First Amendment protections. 
The Rust test is ideal for teachers’ instructional speech as the state and local 
governments, through their curriculums, are conveying a particular message.  The 
state and local governments should be able to ensure that their message is not 
distorted, and therefore, teachers should have no First Amendment right to speak 
outside of the prescribed curriculum.158  Because “school system[s] [do] not 
‘regulate’ teachers’ speech as much as it hires that speech,”159 the power to control 
                                                                
150
 Rust, 500 U.S. at 196.  
151
 Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F. 3d 488 (3d Cir. 1998). 
152
 Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1149 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001).  
153
 Edwards, 156 F. 3d at 488. 
154
 Id. at 491-92. 
155
 Id. at 491.  
156
 See Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that a university professor 
did not have a First Amendment right to expression via the school’s grade assignment 
procedures).  
157
 See infra text accompanying notes 202-13.  
158
 See Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 2007). 
159
 Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479.  
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the subjects and viewpoints that are being expressed in the classroom should rest 
with state and local governments, not teachers.160 
IV.  TESTS APPLIED: WHY COURTS SHOULD RELY ON RUST FOR TEACHERS’ 
INSTRUCTIONAL SPEECH 
The current split that exists in the circuits regarding which of the three available 
tests to apply can be difficult to analyze, especially in light of the fact that even the 
courts themselves have not examined the advantages or disadvantages of using one 
test over the other.161  Further confusion arises when the courts combine the tests or 
apply variations of a test.162  This section examines the reasons for and against using 
the Hazelwood and Pickering tests and shows why Rust and its line of precedent best 
protect the core interests of public schools.  
A.  Analysis of the Hazelwood Test 
The Hazelwood test is used by an overwhelming majority of the courts163 mainly 
because, of the three tests, Hazelwood is the only one that was created in a school 
environment.164  The Hazelwood test focuses on the interests of the state as an 
educator, and thus it is more tailored to the school environment than the Pickering 
test, which focuses on the state as an employer, or the Rust test, which focuses on the 
state as the speaker.165  By focusing on the state as an educator, the Hazelwood test 
ensures that teachers’ speech is not mistakenly attributed to the views of the school 
by making certain that students learn mandated curriculum without being exposed to 
unsuitable material.166  The Court in Hazelwood emphasized that a school does not 
have to tolerate student speech when other students, parents, and members of the 
public may reasonably perceive the speech in question to bear the imprimatur of the 
school.167 As such, the extension of Hazelwood to teachers seems appropriate 
because speech by teachers may reasonably be perceived to bear the imprimatur of 
the school more than student speech.168  This logic, however, does not take into 
consideration the fact that nothing in the Hazelwood opinion shows an intent to apply 
the same standards equally to students and teachers.169 
                                                                
160
 Id. at 479-80. 
161
 Daly, supra note 60, at 17. 
162
 Id.  This is especially true for the Hazelwood and Pickering tests, which inherently, 
leave a lot of room for inconsistent application.  See infra text accompanying notes 175-84, 
190-98.  
163
 See supra note 65. 
164
 Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1014.  
165
 Id.  
166
 Id.  
167
 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
168
 Daly, supra note 60, at 14. 
169
 Id. at 12.  One commentator described this over-extension of Hazelwood as “[t]rying to 
fit the square peg of a teacher’s in class speech into the round hole of Hazelwood” and by 
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss1/7
2010] FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 203 
Under the Hazelwood test, courts routinely find that there is no First Amendment 
protection of teachers’ speech when a public school reasonably believes that the 
speech would undermine pedagogical concerns.170  In that sense, the Hazelwood test 
is analogous to the rational basis test, in that so long as there is some rational basis 
between regulating the teachers’ speech and a legitimate pedagogical concern, the 
regulation will be upheld.171  Even though teachers have the burden of persuasion in 
Hazelwood cases, because of this broad definition of “reasonably related to 
pedagogical concerns,” school boards are more successful than teachers.172  While 
the Hazelwood test is less protective of an individual’s speech,173 the test prevents 
individual judges from intruding on the school board’s authority, as courts rarely find 
a government action unconstitutional under such standard.174 
Despite the seemingly predictable nature of Hazelwood, a common problem of 
the test’s application is the definition of “pedagogical.”175 Some courts have adopted 
a very broad definition of “pedagogical,” under which schools have unlimited 
authority to regulate teachers’ speech, sometimes without even showing that the 
restriction relates to a legitimate pedagogical concern.176  Alternatively, other courts 
have no definition of pedagogical, and instead determine the definition on a case by 
                                                          
doing so, courts “distort[ed] Hazelwood itself, undermining its utility in the student speech 
context for which it was actually designed.”  Waldman, supra note 69, at 108. 
170
 Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1017; see also Elizabeth Decoux, Does Congress Find Facts or 
Construct Them? The Ascendance of Politics Over Reliability, Perfected in Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 319, 366 (2008) (explaining that the rational basis test leads to 
the regulation being upheld, whereas “when the rational basis is not the test, legislatures tend 
to fair poorly”). 
171
 It is important to note that because of the rational basis-type analysis under Hazelwood, 
the outcome of Hazelwood cases and Rust cases will almost always be the same. The 
difference is the way of reaching the outcome.  Under the Hazelwood test, the school board 
must make a showing of a reasonable relation to pedagogical concerns.  Kuhn, supra note 63, 
at 1010.  Also, as discussed below, other problems could arise under Hazelwood, thus making 
it unpredictable and inconsistent.  See infra text accompanying notes 175-84. 
172
 Jason R. Wiener, Note, The Right to Teach, the Right to Speak, and the Right to be a 
Valuable Contributor to a Child’s Upbringing: Public School Teachers’ First Amendment 
Right to Free Speech and Expression, 32 W. ST. U. L. REV. 105, 117-18 (2004).  
173
 Heather M. Good, Comment, “The Forgotten Child of our Constitution”: The Parental 
Free Exercise Right to Direct the Education and Religious Upbringing of Children, 54 EMORY 
L.J. 641, 645 (2005) (explaining that rational basis type scrutiny “is less protective of 
individual rights and liberties”). 
174
 Id.  
175
 Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1017-19 (describing various pedagogical concerns).  
176
 Id. at 1018.  The Fourth Circuit held that anything educational is pedagogical, thus 
including all speech relating to the curriculum.  Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 
136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998).  The Sixth  Circuit expanded the definition even more by finding 
that “legitimate pedagogical concerns is by no means confined to the academic.”  Poling v. 
Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1989).  These broad definitions of pedagogical show a 
moving trend towards the justifications underlying Rust in that public schools can regulate 
teachers’ instructional speech.  
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case basis.177  This “undefined nature of ‘legitimate pedagogical concerns,’ coupled 
with judicial deference to the judgment of school officials, creates the potential for 
abuse,”178 as well as inconsistency. 
Another problem under Hazelwood deals with the requirement of notice, as set 
forth in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.179  A notice 
requirement is constitutionally fulfilled when it adequately informs the average 
teacher of what kind of speech is prohibited.180  Although some courts have outright 
rejected a notice requirement,181 the plurality of courts do call for notice.182  Some 
courts that have a notice requirement create leeway for the schools by not mandating 
that there be an express prohibition of every imaginable speech, but rather, that there 
only be policies and regulations in place to give teachers a reasonable expectation of 
prohibited speech.183  Other courts, however, simply weigh adequate notice as a 
factor in the determination of reasonableness of the regulation.184 These different 
requirements for notice, as well as the undefined nature of pedagogical concerns, 
have led to unpredictability and inconsistency among the courts applying 
Hazelwood. 
B.  Analysis of the Pickering Test 
Whereas under the Hazelwood test the government regulations are rarely struck 
down, in Pickering cases, speech involving public concern is rarely found to cause 
work interferences.185  As a result, unless special circumstances exist, such as the 
need for confidentiality or special obligations, the teachers’ speech is usually 
protected by the First Amendment.186 
                                                                
177
 Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 454 (1st Cir. 1993). 
178
 Daly, supra note 60, at 13.  
179
 Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1012-13. 
180
 Id.  
181
 Boring, 136 F.3d at 364.  
182
 Daly, supra note 60, at 23 (explaining that the First, Second, and Eighth Circuits have 
some type of notice requirement).  When the courts find that there is inadequate notice, the 
regulation will be unconstitutional on vagueness grounds.  Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1012. 
183
 Daly, supra note 60, at 23 (citing Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 454 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
184
 Id. (citing Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990); 
Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 796 (5th Cir. 1989)). 
185
 Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1007; see also William P. Barnette, The Run for the Roses 
Meets the First Amendment: An Examination of Desormeaux v. Kentucky Racing Commission 
and the Constitutionality of Prohibitions on Jockey Advertising, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 371, 379 
(2004).  
186
 Id. at 1007-08.  As Justice White noted in his opinion in Pickering:  
The State may not fire the teacher for making [false statements on a matter of public 
concern] unless, as I gather it, there are special circumstances, not present in this case, 
demonstrating an overriding state interest, such as the need for confidentiality or the 
special obligations which a teacher in a particular position may owe to his superiors. 
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 582 (1968) (White, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
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Under the Pickering test, courts recognize that the essence of the relationship 
between teachers and schools is that of employer-employee.187  When teachers speak, 
they are doing what they were hired and paid to do, which is why courts use the 
Pickering test for in-class speech.188  The underlying rationale for extending 
Pickering to this context is that teachers, as public employees, should not give up 
their right to speak on matters of public concern solely because of the fact that they 
are public employees.189  
Despite accounting for the employer-employee relationship of teachers and 
schools, a common criticism of the Pickering test is that the “public concern” 
standard is not tailored for instructional speech.190  Because “the essence of a 
teacher’s role in the classroom, and therefore as an employee, is to discuss with 
students issues of public concern,”191 the Pickering test fails to account for the 
unique environment of public school teachers.192  For example, under the Pickering  
test, the right to speak outside of the curriculum is non-existent for some teachers, 
such as math teachers, while other teachers, such as social studies or literature 
teachers, regularly touch on matters of public concern.193  Because of this, some 
teachers enjoy protection on most of their speech, as they can claim their speech 
touched on matters of public concern, while other teachers receive no protection.194 
Further inconsistencies are present with the “public concern” standard, as courts 
have the authority to determine “public concern” by focusing on the role of the 
speaker or the context, form, and content of the speech in question.195  Because it is 
“within a court’s discretion to choose which of these factors to focus on most 
heavily,”196 there is no uniformity among the courts when determining matters of 
public concern.197 
The test is also ill-suited for instructional speech because the speech in Pickering 
was created by examining speech spoken outside of the classroom.  Instructional 
speech, however, is spoken inside the classroom.  The Pickering test, “designed and 
developed to address one paradigm of expression, cannot be stretched in an 
intellectually honest manner to cover in-class speech, no matter how deserving of 
                                                                
187
 Waldman, supra note 69, at 102. 
188
 Id.  
189
 Kuhn, supra note 63, at 1002.  
190
 Id. at 1008-09.  
191
 Waldman, supra note 69, at 103 (quoting Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 98 
F.3d 1474, 1479-80 (4th Cir. 1996)).  
192
 Id. 
193
 Vikram Amar & Alan Brownstein, Academic Freedom, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 17, 19 (2005). 
194
 Id.  
195
 Emily Holes Davis, Note & Recent Development, Protecting the “Marketplace of 
Ideas”: The First Amendment and Public School Teachers’ Classroom Speech, 3 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 335, 361-62 (2005). 
196
 Id. at 361. 
197
 Id. at 361-63. 
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constructional protection.”198  As instructional speech is made pursuant to teachers’ 
job descriptions, Pickering, standing alone, is not applicable; however, the changes 
Garcetti made to the traditional Pickering test are applicable to teachers’ 
instructional speech. 
Garcetti was important not only for the change it made to the Pickering test, but 
also for affirming the relevance of Rust by concluding that the “public has the right 
to expect its government to work towards ends that have been ‘democratically agreed 
upon.’”199  This analogy can be easily extended to public schools because when 
teachers are speaking as the government, the public has the right to expect that 
teachers will instruct according to what the state and local governments have agreed 
upon.  The analysis under Garcetti is more straightforward than both Pickering and 
Hazelwood because this test contains a “per se rule categorizing official duty speech 
as government expression.”200  Furthermore, the application of the Garcetti test and 
the Rust test are very similar in that, with public employee speech (Garcetti) and 
governmental speech (Rust), the government has in a sense purchased, through salary 
or funding, the speech, and therefore, has a right to regulate the content of that 
speech.201  
Whether the Garcetti test or Rust test is applied to teachers’ instructional speech, 
the outcome is the same in that the teachers have no First Amendment protection. 
Rust, however, is more applicable to instructional speech as teachers’ speech in the 
classroom is that of the government and not of public employees.   
C.  Extending Rust to Teachers’ Instructional Speech 
Courts may hesitate to extend Rust to teachers’ instructional speech because the 
dicta in Rust expressed reservations about broadening Rust’s reach to universities; 
therefore, by showing that K-12 schools are too dissimilar to universities, the Rust 
dicta presents no problem in extending Rust to public schools.  Second, by showing 
that instructional speech is really government speech, the necessary foundation will 
be laid to then show that the government has First Amendment protections of 
instructional speech, not teachers.  Although there are some problems legally and 
realistically with the Rust test, the underlying rationale of Rust, as well as policy 
concerns, support Rust’s application over the Hazelwood and Pickering tests.   
                                                                
198
 Daly, supra note 60, at 11. 
199
 Andrew Bernie, Recent Development, A Principled Limitation on Judicial Inference: 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1047, 1056 (2003). 
200
 Nicole B. Cásarez, The Student Press, the Public Workplace, and Expanding Notions of 
Government Speech, 35 J.C. & U.L. 1, 50 (2008).  This per se rule in turn leads to judicial 
economy.  Id.  For example, under the Hazelwood test there are requirements of a reasonable 
relationship to pedagogical concerns.  Id.  Although this “reasonable relation” is not a hard 
standard to meet, certain factors, such as notice, can lead to a lengthy analysis.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 175-84.  The Garcetti test, however, does not even require a bare 
reasonableness showing, and as such, the only showing necessary is that the speech is 
instructional.  
201
 Donald J. Weidner, Thoughts on Academic Freedom: Urofksy and Beyond, 33 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 257, 261 (2001). 
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1.  Rust Dicta: Universities vs. Public Schools 
The majority in Rust had specific reservations about extending the decision to 
public forums and public universities,202 and as a result, courts may be hesitant in 
applying Rust to teachers’ instructional speech.  Recognizing that a university is a 
“traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our 
society,” the Rust majority reasoned that the government does not have free reign to 
control speech merely because it subsidizes universities.203  Despite singling out 
universities, the decision makes no reference to whether public schools are in a 
traditional sphere of expression, and thus, exempt from Rust’s reach as well.204 “A 
reasonable implication of this omission is that since public elementary and secondary 
schools receive federal funding, the federal government may condition its grants on 
content-based regulation of the messages purveyed by the schools.”205  
The Supreme Court has traditionally viewed public universities and public 
schools as being so “fundamentally different from each other”206 that there is no 
reason to believe that the Court would refrain from applying Rust to public schools.  
Established precedent recognizes that state legislatures have the “undoubted right to 
prescribe the curriculum for its public schools,”207 whereas the Court has never held 
that legislatures have that same right as to universities.208  Not only do universities 
and public schools differ in the amount of control the government exerts on the 
curriculum, but the purposes and functions of universities209 are significantly 
different from the purposes and functions of public schools.210 
                                                                
202
 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199-200 (1991). 
203
 Id.  
Similarly, we have recognized that the university is a traditional sphere of free 
expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the Government’s 
ability to control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the 
expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth 
doctrines of the First Amendment.  
Id. at 200 (citation omitted).  
204
 See Danielle E. Caminiti, Comment, Brooklyn Institute of Arts & Sciences v. City of 
New York: The Death of the Subsidy and the Birth of the Entitlement in Funding of the Arts, 
10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 875, 896 (2000) (noting that “[t]he decision in 
Rust notably made no reference to museums or public elementary and secondary schools”).  
205
 Susan H. Bitensky, A Contemporary Proposal for Reconciling the Free Speech Clause 
with Curricular Values Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 769, 822 
n.282 (1995).  
206
 Laura A. Jeltema, Comment, Legislators in the Classroom: Why State Legislatures 
Cannot Decide Higher Education Curricula, 54 AM. U.L. REV. 215, 229 (2004). 
207
 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968). 
208
 Jeltema, supra note 206, at 229. 
209
 Id. at 227-31.  The underlying purposes of universities are to “expose students to new 
ideas and to allow for the critical questioning of these ideas,” as well as encourage diversity in 
education. Id. at 230. Although there are limitations on what can be taught to K-12 students, as 
prescribed through the legislature, universities “are free to offer religious, theological, or 
political courses.”  Id. at 231.  Most importantly, “educational experts maintain that the 
curricular inclusion of controversial issues and experience with diversity [in the university 
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The differences between university professors and K-12 teachers further illustrate 
differences between the two educational spheres.  Whereas parents and students 
depend on teachers to follow the curriculum designed by the local governments, 
professors in universities have more autonomy in choosing teaching and research 
topics, and as such, professors have stronger First Amendment protections.211 
Furthermore, because of a higher level of student maturity in universities, the need to 
protect students from controversial or insensitive methods diminishes.212  Professors 
in universities have more flexibility and authority than public teachers; therefore, 
whatever constitutional principles govern professors do not apply to K-12 teachers.213  
The aspects of universities that the majority in Rust was trying to preserve by 
shielding universities from the holding are not applicable to public schools; 
therefore, the dicta in Rust presents no problem for applying the Rust test to 
situations involving public schools. 
2.  The Government is the Speaker in Public Schools 
Teachers’ speech inside the classroom is government speech;214 therefore, the 
government may take legitimate steps to ensure that the messages are not distorted.215  
Determining to whom a speech belongs to is “admittedly . . . difficult once we 
recognize that the state cannot literally speak, but can speak only through the voices 
of others, others who have their own First Amendment rights in many other 
                                                          
setting] promotes the development of necessary life skills.”  Id. at 230-31.  Students in 
universities also have total autonomy in choosing which school to enroll in, what classes to 
take, and which professors to select; in addition, whether or not to pursue higher education in 
the first place is a matter of choice.  Id. at 230.  
210
 Id. at 230.  The purposes and functions of K-12 schools are to prepare “individuals for 
participation as citizens,” and as such, states have an interest in ensuring that certain values are 
included in the curriculum, an interest that is not present in universities.  Id; see also Nathaniel 
J. McDonald, Note, Ohio Charter Schools and Educational Privatization: Undermining the 
Legacy of the State Constitution’s Common School Approach, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 467, 5000 
(2005).  Also, “[w]hile secondary schools are not rigid disciplinary institutions, neither are 
they open forums in which mature adults, already habituated to social restraints, exchange 
ideas on a level of parity.”  W. Stuart Stuller, High School Academic Freedom: The Evolution 
of a Fish Out of Water, 77 NEB. L. REV. 301, 335 (1998). 
211
 Jeltema, supra note 206, at 247.  
212
 Buss, supra note 58, at 274. 
213
 Id. at 277. 
214
 As states and local governments make decisions about the curriculum, “[t]he speech of 
a public school teacher is unquestionably an exercise of state power.”  Stuller, supra note 210, 
at 332.  For example, when teachers use the classroom to push religious beliefs, there will be a 
violation of the Establishment Clause.  Id. 
215
 Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995); see 
also Helen Norton, Not for Attribution: Government’s Interest in Protecting the Integrity of Its 
Own Expression, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1317, 1341 (2004) (noting that when the speech is 
categorized as government speech, the First Amendment allows the government to protect and 
control the speech).  
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contexts.”216  Whether or not speech belongs to the government is something the 
courts constantly wrestle over;217 however, the lower courts rely on four factors when 
determining whether the speech belongs to the government: (1) who is the literal 
speaker; (2) who exercises editorial control; (3) what is the purpose of the program; 
and (4) whether the government or the private entity bears the ultimate 
responsibility.218  
It is not uncommon for the government to use a private speaker to bolster ideas, 
issues, values, and subjects,219 and when doing so, “it should be permitted to decline 
to serve as the ‘dummy’ through which a private ventriloquist projects her views.”220  
When teachers speak in the classroom they appear to be literal speakers; however, 
teachers are only acting as representatives of the school board and the state 
legislatures.221  For example, one way the state may speak is by requiring teachers to 
present only specified state viewpoints on social policy matters, and these 
requirements that the state places on teachers are characterized as government 
speech.222  Even though teachers physically speak in the classroom, the government 
is the literal speaker.223   
The government exercises editorial control over a certain program when the 
speech goal is not to promote specific viewpoints, but rather to allow a limited, 
government-approved range of viewpoints.224  In public education, someone must 
control what ideas, issues, values, and subjects will be taught and what method or 
materials will be used to convey those ideas, issues, values, and subjects.225  Not only 
do most states statutorily express that the government is that someone,226  but as a 
                                                                
216
 Frederick Schauer, Comment, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 84, 100 (1998).  
217
 Norton, supra note 215, at 1329 (“Determining whether certain expression belongs to 
the government or to private speakers . . . can be tricky—so tough, in fact, that courts 
wrestling with these questions have generated inconsistent and often unsatisfying opinions.”).  
218
 Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is both Private and Governmental, 
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 627 n.118 (2008). 
219
 See Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s 
Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 617 (2008). 
220
 Norton, supra note 215, at 1334. 
221
 Buss, supra note 58, at 256. 
222
 Schauer, supra note 216, at 101.  
223
 See Corbin, supra note 218, at 629-30.  
224
 Id. at 634-35. 
225
 Buss, supra note 58, at 241 (“What is taught at any level has to be based on some plan.  
Education in the classroom, particularly over a semester or an extended period of time, cannot 
simply be open-ended, allowing all ideas to come in at any time.  Curriculum decisions entail 
deciding which ideas, which issues, which subjects will be dealt with at what time. . . .  
Someone must have an agenda; someone must have some control on relevance.  Deciding 
whether the teacher or the school board has control of the curriculum is deciding who gets to 
make the determination of what agenda will be and through what materials and what method 
the agenda will be pursued.”).  
226
 Stuller, supra note 210, at 333 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)). 
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matter of public policy, the government should control public school curriculum.227  
The limited range of approved viewpoints is prescribed by the government through 
state legislatures and local governments in the form of the curriculum; therefore, the 
local governments, not the teachers, exercise the editorial control.228  
When determining the purpose of a program, the focus is “the speech goal of the 
government program (if any) in which the speech appears.”229  Many purposes of 
public education exist,230 and local governments set the curriculum in a manner that 
will promote the purposes it wants to achieve. Although public education is 
theoretically meant to be the “marketplace of ideas,”231 realistically the purpose of 
public education is to ensure that students learn ideas, issues, values, and subjects 
defined by the state.232  While the goals of public education may suggest teachers’ 
speech is actually mixed speech,233 the primary purpose of the speech in school is to 
convey the government-approved curriculum.234 
The government bears the ultimate responsibility financially and politically in 
public education.  As public education is wholly funded by the government, “it is a 
logical default position that speech belongs to whoever pays for it.”235 The 
government is responsible politically for the messages conveyed in the classroom.236  
For example, not only can local officials be voted out of office, but parents and 
                                                                
227
 Waldman, supra note 69, at 84 (citing Boring v. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 371 (4th 
Cir. 1998) (en banc)). 
228
 See Corbin, supra note 218, at 633. 
229
 Id. 
230
 See supra note 210. 
231
 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
232
 Alexis Zouhary, Note, The Elephant in the Classroom: A Proposed Framework for 
Applying Viewpoint Neutrality to Student Speech in the Secondary School Setting, 83 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2227, 2254 (2008); see also infra notes 274-76 and accompanying text. 
233
 Corbin, supra note 218, at 634. 
Under current free speech doctrine, speech made to advance a specific viewpoint (the 
first possibility) is generally treated as government speech, while speech made in the 
context of a government program to promote wide-ranging discussion (the second 
possibility) is generally treated as private speech.  It is the third possibility – speech 
made within the context of a government program to promote only certain views – that 
is the subject of considerable debate (and litigation).  So while the first type points to 
government speech and the second to private speech, the third, most contested, 
suggests mixed speech.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
234
 Id. at 634 n.148 (“noting that subsidized speech is treated more like government speech 
if government expression is primary purpose of program and is treated more like private 
speech if purpose is to create forum for private speech” (citing Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The 
Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1358-59 (2001))). 
235
 Id. at 631. 
236
 See Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1016 (9th Cir. 2000).  Through 
the political process, members of the board and state legislatures can be voted out of office, 
and until they are voted out, they are the speakers.  See id. 
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community members also can hold local officials responsible for what happens in 
public schools, usually by expressing dissatisfaction at publicly-held meetings.237  
The government is not just accountable at the local level, but accountability is seen 
on the state level (through assessment movements) and on the federal level (through 
acts, such as No Child Left Behind).238  All of these mandated guidelines are in place 
to ensure that the government remains accountable and bears the ultimate 
responsibility for speech in the classroom.239 
Applicability of Rust hinges on the fact that when the government uses private 
speakers to convey a particular message, that speech is government speech.  In 
public education, the government does not create a program to encourage private 
speech,240 but rather, the government uses private speakers (teachers) to convey the 
particular message prescribed by the government (curriculum), such that teachers’ 
speech in the classroom is government speech.241 
3.  State and Local Governments Control Instructional Speech, Not Teachers 
The responsibility of formulating and executing a curriculum is vested with local 
school boards and state legislatures,242 while the responsibility of implementing the 
curriculum is vested with teachers.243  The government regulates educational 
institutions by selecting moral values and theories and by imposing restrictions on 
teachers and students.244  Consequently, the content of public education is attributed 
to “constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions at the state level [and] 
curricular decisions of local school boards.”245  When school boards prescribe the 
way the curriculum is taught, individual teachers do not have a First Amendment 
                                                                
237
 Id. 
238
 See Todd A. DeMitchell & Terri A. DeMitchell, Statutes and Standards: Has the Door 
to Educational Malpractice Been Opened?, 2003 BYU EDUC & L.J. 485, 486 & n.6 (2003).  
239
 See id. at 486.  State legislators and the federal government put into place these 
standardized tests because legislators felt that this would be the best way to ensure that schools 
were doing their job.  Id.  If the student individually fails, that student will not be promoted, so 
in a sense, each individual can be held accountable for his/her own scores.  Id. at 487.  
Speaking as a general matter though, the school board bears the ultimate responsibility 
because if too many students fail and the school gets a failing grade, then it is the 
responsibility of the school to make changes and restructure the school.  Id.  But see Susan P. 
Stuart, Citizen Teacher: Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281, 
1337 (2008), for an argument that there is no reason to hold teachers accountable for test 
results, as teachers do not have control or discretion over the curriculum they teach. 
240
 See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rectors & 
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
241
 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)). 
242
 DeMitchell & DeMitchell, supra note 238, at 509. 
243
 Buss, supra note 58, at 256.  
244
 John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1138 (2005). 
245
 Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 
IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1420 (2001). 
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right to “preempt the decisions of their superiors” and speak outside the 
curriculum.246  
When the educational institution decides the content of the education it 
prescribes, it is the government speaking through the state and school board, and the 
government is thus entitled to regulate the content of that speech when it enlists 
private speakers (i.e., teachers) to convey that message.247  The government usually 
relies upon the credibility of third-party sources to illustrate, bolster, and explain the 
government’s position,248 and school systems are no different.  When school systems 
hire teachers, they are entrusting those teachers to teach the set state-defined ideas, 
issues, values, and subjects;249 therefore, it follows that teachers’ instructional speech 
is a function of employment.250  When teachers speak in a way that does not meet 
government approval, the school systems’ educational missions are not only 
undermined, but teachers are also interfering with the school boards’ managerial 
authority and responsibilities.251  Under Rust, when the government makes a choice 
about what is or is not to be said in the classroom, the government is allowed to 
enforce that choice.252  Furthermore, “because K-12 schools ‘speak’ more on the 
government’s behalf than independently, there are limitations on what the state can 
teach in K-12 schools because the state must remain neutral.”253  It is important to 
ensure that the state stay neutral.  To ensure neutrality, teachers should have no right 
to speak outside of the limitations placed on them by the government.     
Teachers are not subjected to the certain safeguards in the educational system of 
school boards and state legislatures.  Specifically, school boards and state 
legislatures are held accountable through the democratic process, whereas teachers 
are not.254  Through elections, those who prescribe the curriculum answer to the 
                                                                
246
 Waldman, supra note 69, at 87 (“Although a teacher’s First Amendment right allows 
him to say what he wishes outside the classroom, the inmates do not run the asylum.  If a 
school board or principal decides that a particular subject is to be taught in a particular way, 
individual teachers do not have a constitutional right in the classroom to preempt the decisions 
of their superiors.” (citing Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School 
Today? Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 62, 67 (2002))). 
247
 Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491-92 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995)). 
248
 Norton, supra note 219, at 617. 
249
 Id.; Zouhary, supra note 232, at 2256.  
250
 Stuart, supra note 239, at 1337 (“[T]eachers’ curriculum delivery has become a 
function of employment not a function of education.  Instead, the teachers are now just 
government speakers, and the rigor required of the curriculum lies entirely with the school 
board.”). 
251
 Buss, supra note 58, at 242. 
252
 Stuller, supra note 210, at 331. 
253
 Jeltema, supra note 206, at 231 (footnote omitted).  
254
 Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1016 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)); see also supra 
notes 236-58 and accompanying text.  
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people, so that what the government decides should be taught and said in the 
classroom does not go unchecked.255  “Moreover, it cannot be accepted as a premise 
that the student is voluntarily in the classroom and willing to be exposed to a 
teaching method which, though reasonable, is not approved by the school 
authorities.”256 Although it is impossible for teachers to educate without speaking,257 
it does not follow that  teachers have a constitutional right to present personal views 
against the directions of elected officials.258  It would be illogical to allow teachers to 
“get the last word in” the curriculum.259  
Many proponents of the Hazelwood and Pickering tests believe that these tests 
ensure some form of academic freedom, which is questionably an essential part of 
the educational process.260  There is much debate among scholars on the importance 
of academic freedom and whether or not academic freedom should be a 
constitutional right or whether it can be raised as a defense in legal proceedings.261 
Even assuming there is some right to academic freedom, that right does not belong to 
teachers, but rather the right belongs to institutions.262  The Rust test ensures that 
teachers cannot speak their own views outside of the government prescribed 
curriculum in the name of academic freedom, regardless of whether the speech is 
related to pedagogical or public concerns.263   
4.  Rust’s Application: The Problem with Specifics 
Although teachers’ convey government messages when they are teaching in the 
classroom,264 the lack of specificity in the messages presents an obstacle in applying 
the Rust test.  In Rust and its line of precedent, the content of the government speech 
has a very narrow focus.265  Conversely though, in instructional speech, the 
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government controls the broad, or macro message, but it does not exert control on 
the specific, or micro message.266  Even though the government controls the subjects 
that are taught in the classroom, as well as the point of views presented in those 
subjects,267 it stops quite short of providing teachers’ with a “script” of what to say in 
the classroom.268  A problem with the Rust test is that when applying it to teachers’ 
speech, the test would allow the government to ensure that teachers’ do not distort a 
particular government message, even though no government message is specifically 
laid out.269  A further problem arises in the absence of specific guidelines about what 
teachers can and cannot say in the classroom: it can be difficult to “disentangle what 
. . .  [teachers] say[] on the basis of delegated authority from that which reflects [the 
teachers’] personal views.”270  The realities of teaching, such as unanticipated 
questions or comments from students, make it hard for the government to regulate 
teachers’ speech, which the Rust test does not take into account.271  Despite these 
limitations, the Rust test is still a better fit for instructional speech cases as the ability 
of local and state governments to effectively control the subjects and point of views 
that are taught in the school “is largely measured by [the government’s] ability to 
control teacher speech.”272  
5.  Promoting Judicial and Political Economy with the Rust Test  
The authority to determine whether or not and to what extent teachers’ speech is 
protected should not be in the hands of judges, but rather in the hands of professional 
educators, such as the school and state, as well as the general public.273  The 
decision-making process for determining what is permissible to say in the classroom 
involves issues, which are more “subjective and evaluative than typical issues 
presented in disciplinary decisions and . . . such academic judgments should be left 
to professional educators.”274  Judges should, therefore, leave these types of decisions 
to educational experts: the state legislatures and school boards.275  Although courts 
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traditionally decline to “micromanage” educational decisions,276 lawsuits are 
constantly filed concerning what teachers can and cannot say in the classroom.277 
Rust ensures a straight-forward and uncomplicated test, which would in turn cut 
down on the number of lawsuits filed and heard against schools that are “already 
over-burdened and cash-strapped.”278  Realistically, the only time judges should 
intervene into educational matters is to protect students rights;279 otherwise, the 
primary educational authority rests with state and local governments. 
Along with the professional educators, decisions of what should be said in the 
classroom should belong to the local communities.  Local control of public education 
is in place to promote the values of the local communities.280  As the Supreme Court 
has recognized, school boards have a  “legitimate and substantial community interest 
in promoting respect for authority and traditional values be they social, moral or 
political.”281  The public has an interest in ensuring that certain values are promoted 
and local officials carry the risk of being voted out of office for failure to promote 
those values.282  When teachers talk in the classroom, they are speaking on behalf of 
the government; therefore, what the government can say is not a constitutional issue 
left to judges to determine but should be left to the public and the political process.283  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Teachers may not necessarily “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”284 but they do shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech the moment they start teaching in the classroom.  
Although the Hazelwood and Pickering tests ensure this in some situations, the Rust 
test is the only test that will consistently result in teachers having no First 
Amendment protections in the classroom.  
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When the government funds a program, such as public education, the government 
has a right to ensure that the message is not distorted by teachers’ personal views and 
beliefs.  This is not to say that teachers can never express personal views.  Outside of 
the classroom, teachers’ rights are protected by the First Amendment;285 however, no 
such protection exists in the classroom.  Students in elementary and secondary 
schools are very impressionable, and because of this, state and local governments 
must take many measures to ensure that the messages that students receive are 
appropriate and reflect the views of the public as a whole.  It is illogical that teachers 
can present completely biased views not reflective of the state and local governments 
views’ and then claim that the First Amendment permits them to do so.  
The application of the Rust test will not only force teachers to be more conscious 
of what they say, but it will also free state and local governments from the fear that 
teachers will constantly undermine the government’s authority.  Although the Rust 
test is not perfect, it is the most logical test to apply in terms of the context behind 
the development of the test.  As such, the question as to the extent of teachers’ First 
Amendment protections of instructional speech does not even need to be examined 
because application of the Rust test will always result in teachers having no First 
Amendment protection in the classroom.  
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